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- Intelligence Report 1

Pearl Harbor Not

By BILL FRITTS

An intelligence report submitted to Washington, D.C., two weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbor could have prevented that disastrous assault, if the government had been willing to believe it. Brig. Gen. Elliott R. Thorpe (U.S. Army, Ret.) told a Sarasota Shrine Club meeting Thursday at Morrison's Imperial House.

Gen. Thorpe, head of counter-intelligence for Gen. Douglas MacArthur in World War II, said that the pressures that are put upon intelligence agents are causing them to distort or soften the true facts, and that this is "a very serious thing" for this country.

"For a long time," he said, "our intelligence personnel have been shading their opinions because of fears of how this will affect their futures."

"When a man writes a report today, it may rise up 10 years from now to haunt him."

Gen. Thorpe was lend-lease commissioner for the Dutch East Indies at the time the Pearl Harbor report was compiled. It was obtained, he said, in the latter part of November,

1941, from Dutch intelligence agents, who had gotten it from a Japanese code.

The report was sent to the White House, he said, where it was rejected.

Years later, he said, he ran into the commander-in-chief of the Dutch army who had been instrumental in feeding the broken-code information to him.

"Did you ever really send that dispatch?" he quoted the Dutch general as asking.

When assured that it had been, the Dutch general then told him that he, too, had sent the report to Washington. It was sent to the Dutch embassy, he said, which took it over to the War Department.

"There it was received very early. They asked: 'How are you going to convince us you didn't fake this thing?'"

"Well, two weeks later," Gen. Thorpe said, "they found out he didn't fake it."

The same thing happened, he said, in regard to the Korean War.

"Everyone in Southeast Asia knew the attack was coming in South Korea," he said. "They had the whole story, chapter and verse, but Washington didn't see fit to accept it."

He cited another instance involving the fall of the Dutch in the East Indies. They had been there

for 300 years, he said. They didn't think the Indonesians would reject their rule, following the war. Intelligence reports, he said, indicated the Japanese had persuaded the Indonesians to toss the Dutch out.

"They said," he related, "that the pieces would fall back in place, after the war—but they didn't fall back in place."

The refusal of the official mind to accept facts and reality, when it doesn't suit their purposes or prejudices, was exemplified in the case of President Sukarno of Indonesia, he said.

"Sukarno was a Communist before the war," he said. "He went to Russia and was trained there. He's a Communist sym-

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